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A presumption exists that greater reliance on competition in procurement policies will result 
in substantial cost savings to the U.S. Many policies have been changed and many are in the process 
of being changed as the Department of Defense itself explores what appears to be a basic shift in 
philosophy about best procurement policies. Of particular interest has been a policy of" second 
sourcing" which is widely presumed to be beneficial. It is one of the cornerstones of new policy 
directions. Recent regulations provide for wider use of second sourcing to reduce procurement costs 
following recommendations of the President's Blue Ribbon Commission (1986). 
A second source can obviously compete more effectively if the teclmical data developed by 
the first source are made available prior to submitting bids in the reprocurement phase. As such 
technical data problems are seen to be a major obstacle in the way of competitive reprocurement 
(Yuspeh 1976), the regulatory response has been to call for the contracting agency's acquisition of 
the technical data of the contractor and require the agency to make the data available to prospective 
competitive suppliers for rcprocuremcnt. Since a nonncgligible fraction of government procurement 
is developed as a result of private research and development activity by suppliers who also operate in 
commercial markets, there exists a countervailing presumption that the potentially adverse effects of 
the policy on the incentives for private research and development may mitigate the beneficial effects 
of second source contracting. The problem is complex and the exact nature of costs and benefits of a 
policy of second sourcing remains to be studied systematically. The purpose of this paper is to 
integrate and experimentally test models of competition as applied to second sourcing policies. 
Should a presumption exist that a policy of second sourcing is generally beneficial? If it is not 
generally beneficial, under what circumstances is it? In particular, is the existence of private 
research and development, and of commercial markets important? What types of tools and theories 
should be applied to determine the answer to the question? 
*The fmancial support of the National Science Foundation and the California Institute of Technology Laboratory for 
E:-;pcrimental Economics and Political Science is gratefully acknowledged. Both Mark Olson and Hsing Yang Lee 
contributed significantly to the development of the software used in the experiments. The conunents of David McNicol on 
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This study is focused on two topics in government procurement problems: second sourcing, 
and private research and development investment in procurement. A simple theoretical framework 
is developed to analyze the likely effects on private R&D and procurement prices of recent proposals 
regarding competition in procurement and the associated data-rights policy. The framework is also 
used to demonstrate a major flaw in the current methodology used in the evaluation of the benefits of 
second sourcing. The framework can be used to identify a competition-reduction effect of second 
sourcing. In procurement environments where private R&D is an important factor and potential 
sellers have commercial markets which may be adversely affected, second sourcing may reduce 
competition in the initial procurement stage. Experimental methods are used to test for the existence 
of the effect. 
The complexity of general procurement problems lead immediately to an inescapable 
conclusion. Policy decisions will necessarily be based on theory. In spite of the protestations of 
pragmatic, practical, realistic, and anti-theoretical decisionmakers, some theory, good or bad, 
mathematical or verbal, implicit or explicit will be behind every policy decision. The problems are 
complex. The variables are numerous. The data are sparce. As will be outlined in the following 
section, policies based on solid field experience cannot exist. Theory cannot be avoided. The only 
questions are which theory and how does one decide which theory? 
The strategy of this research is to first outline sets of basic principles on which competing 
theories of procurement rest. The strategy is then to undertake many procurements under controlled 
laboratory circumstances in which costs, infonnation, policies, profits, research, etc. are well defined 
and observable. Competing theories will be tested against data in these simple cases of procurement. 
If a theory works poorly in the simple cases or if it is actually misleading in the simple cases then its 
reliability in complex cases is automatically in question. The simple cases of experiments are 
proposed as test-beds for theories that are to be ultimately used to analyze very complex phenomena. 
Two broad classes of theories are of relevance to procurement issues. The first theory is 
implicit in the standard methodology that has been applied to generate the presumption in favor of 
second sourcing. It involves no features of strategic behavior. The theory reflects practical decisions 
forced by limitations of data and the time and talent needed to incorporate more elaborate theories 
into empirical tools. This theory is in stark contrast to the alternative body of theory which rests 
upon the theory of games and strategic behavior. As it turns out the differences are of such 
importance that if the game theoretic approach is the correct approach then the standard 
methodology could lead to the wrong decision regarding second sourcing due to a bias in the way 
data is interpreted. 
The experiments reported in the body of the paper focus directly on the issue of proper 
theory. The first question asked is which body of theory best explains what is observed in the simple 
experiments? Since the theories will be applied to a wide rdnge of complex circumstances accuracy 
in the simple cases should be a minimal expectation. If the data from the experiments suggest 
significant strategic behavior, then the field measurements based on the standard empirical approach 
could be misleading. However, existence of strategic forces docs not immediately imply a verdict 
regarding the policy. This is because game theoretic considerations arc consistent with a number of 
equilibrium configurations of the strategic effects. At some of these equilibria, alternative sourcing 
policies cannot be distinguished with regard to the procurement prices they give rise to. As there is 
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no compelling reason to rule such equilibria out as implausible on game theoretic grounds, 
experimental data can be of additional use in identifying the empirically more plausible equilibria. 
If the experimental observations mainly cover equilibrium situations where the sourcing rule does 
matter, and it matters in ways contrary to the general presumption that second sourcing will be 
beneficial, then the standard methodology gives biased answers to the question of which policy. 
As it turns out, the last situation is the case. Principles of game theory are important and 
must be incorporated into policy analysis. These principles can be used to show that under a large 
set of plausible circumstances sole sourcing should be used over second sourcing. Furthermore, the 
standard methodology will bias the interpretation of the field data in favor of second sourcing. The 
only resolution is field work which incorporates the proper theoretical tools. 
DIMENSIONS OF THE PROBLEM 
The problems related to procurement involve a conjunction of some of the most difficult and 
challenging issues in economics. Table 1 illustrates the dimensions of the procurement policy 
problem and important variables in each dimension. 
Formally acquisition policy is a combination of decisions along three dimensions: (1) 
supplier selection procedure, (2) contract type, and (3) sourcing rule. The policymaker chooses from 
among several mutually exclusive options and suboptions in the first column. For example the 
policy might be to use second price auctions, a fixed price contract, and sole sourcing. An 
alternative policy could involve first price auction together with cost-plus contracts and sole 
sourcing. It is clear that the number of potential policies is as large as the number of combinations. 
The performance of a given combination of decisions along these dimensions can be evaluated 
according to one or more of the performance criteria listed in the second column in Table 1. Again, 
a large number of possibilities can be seen. Each criterion can potentially yield a different 
evaluation and thus must be applied independently. The performance of a given policy as evaluated 
by a given criterion would depend on economic circumstances such as those found in the third 
column. The list of factors that determine the economic circumstances given in column 3 is 
restricted to those which have been or can readily be formalized conceptually in a theoretical model. 
Even with this restricted list the number of potential circumstances is large. 
The question of the effects of competitive reprocurement cannot be answered on purely 
empirical grounds. The problems are so numerous and complicated and the number of variables 
involved is so large that sufficient data will never exist. Judgments based on experience alone will 
by necessity be inadequate. Some theory, whether it is made explicit or not, about the fundamental 
factors in the economic structure that underlies the procurement problem will necessarily precede 
any empirical effort. Any system designed to measure such a complex phenomenon must be based 
(explicitly or implicitly) on some theory of economic behavior. The key to proper analysis is 
reliable theory. 
Ideally, an analytical framework would provide a classification of proper policies according 
to each possible criterion under any given set of factors which determine the economic environment. 
Lacking such an ideal map which covers the cmire territory, studies of given policies under varying 
economic circumstances would help to clarify the systematic effects of certain factors, and uncover 
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underlying tradeoffs which should be taken into account in policymaking. A first stage in a proper 
analysis is to evaluate the theories from which broad-ranging conclusions can be drawn. 
There are two broad classes of theories distinguished by their treatment of, and the emphasis 
they place on, incentives, strategic behavior, and information conditions. One class is game 
theoretical and the other class is the theory that is implicitly assumed in empirical work. The nature 
and the implications of incentives, information, and strategic factors constitute the main focus of 
modem game theoretical studies whereas the issues implied by the existence of these factors, 
although acknowledged, are not explicitly accounted for in empirical work in the field. 
Existing game theoretical studies cover some of possibilities outlined in Table 1. The 
procurement problem lends itself as an application of several branches of modem economic theory. 
In particular, theories of auctions and contracts have focused directly on types of transactions which 
have many of the features that characterize the federal acquisition programs. A number of studies in 
this literature provide important analytical tools which can be used to incorporate strategic behavior 
in general models of procurement policy. For instance, there is a well-developed theoretical 
framework for the study of different types of auctions and contracts in economic literature (Vickrey 
1961; Myerson 1981; Maskin and Riley 1984; Milgram and Weber 1982, 1985; Harris and Raviv 
1981; Riley and Samuelson 1981; McAffee and McMillan 1985a; Laffont and Tiro1e 1987b; 
Dasgupta and Spulber 1987). Additional studies are underway (Besen and Terasawa 1987a and 
1987b). 
A need to study sourcing rules under circumstances in which R&D is an important factor 
introduces a dynamic element that has special features in terms of possible strategic behavior. A 
proper analysis of these dynamic features calls for extensions of the tools mentioned above. Second 
sourcing has been studied by several authors (Anton and Yao 1987a; Demski et aL 1987; Laffont and 
Tirole 1987a). Demski, Sappington and Miller conclude that second sourcing is a valuable auditing 
tool for a regulator. Anton and Yao (1'1o7a) and Laffont and Tirole (1987a) both examine a situation 
where an incumbent producer has private infom1ation on the cost of the program and gains 
experience during initial production. In Anton and Yao (1987a) the experience gained depends only 
on the size of the initial production, whereas in Laffont and Tirole (1987a) experience is the result of 
the incumbent's investment. Laffont and Tirole (1987a) develop a model which reveals the 
importance of factors which determine the investment environment for the performance of different 
contract types and auction rules in reprocurement. Because the model takes as given a situation 
where a supplier for the initial production is already selected, the effect of the policy decisions on 
incentives in the stage prior to selection of the initial supplier is not modeled. Riordan and 
Sappington (1988) in a model which takes these linkages into account conclude with a pessimistic 
view of second sourcing in procurement. 
Private research and development, and vulnerability of prospective suppliers' commercial 
markets under government data-rights requiremenL' are additional factors which may enl1ance the 
adverse effects already identified in models of second sourcing. Since data-rights requirements 
constitute an essential pan of second-sourcing initiatives, existence and size of the prospective 
suppliers' private commercial markets suggest themselves as factors which may add to the "cost 
side" of second sourcing. In addition to and independent of the other effects, second sourcing may 
reduce competition in the initial phase of procurement when these features arc taken into account. 
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The theory which lies implicitly at the foundations of empirical work is much different from 
the theory which stems from game theory. As Anton and Yao (1987b) observe in their survey of 
empirical studies on the effectiveness of competitive reprocurement, there is a "broad consensus 
among the studies with regard to the conceptual framework that underlies the analysis," and "a 
considerable gap between empirical studies on procurement and recent theoretical work in the area. 
The issues that are emphasized in theoretical models (informational asymmetries, strategic behavior, 
commitment) do not play a significant role in the empirical effort." In terms of Table 1, economic 
conditions, the third column, are not systematically a part of the analysis in the body of empirical 
studies. 
The key analytical construct in the conceptual framework common to the empirical studies 
is the so called "learning curve" along which prices move downward with accumulated production 
experience. Much of empirical effort has focused on the specification and estimation of the learning 
curve from historical data on costs and/or prices. Most of the previous empirical studies of second 
sourcing in procurement employ examples, case studies, and statistical methods using historical data 
to get estimates of the benefits of the policy. Case studies comparing observed procurement costs 
before and after breakout 1 (with adjustments for "learning curve" effects to get estimates of what the 
price would have been had the sole-source situation been continued) seem to be the standard 
methodology in the evaluation of second-sourcing policy (Anton and Yao 1987b, Yuspeh 1976). 
This comparison typically results in the conclusion that, disregarding the direct cost of technology 
transfer, second sourcing results in substantial cost savings. 
A METHOD OF EVALUATION 
Case studies can be a basis for understanding the underlying economics but the complexity 
of the problems dictates a need for other sources of data. Modem laboratory experimental methods 
can now be very useful. Laboratory methods can be used to test the predictions of competing 
models of the economics of procurement and to generate a data base under controlled conditions for 
an empirical comparison of the relative performance of alternative policies. 
Experimental Setting 
The experimental focus is on private R&D decisions and procurement costs under fixed-
price contracts. The contracts considered arc production contracts as opposed to development 
contracts. Research and development is undertaken by private parties in anticipation of a subsequent 
production contract. The procurement cycle consisL' of two phases: an initial procurement and a 
reprocurcmcnt phase. The first phase roughly corresponds to the first three phases of the 
procurement cycle in the general setting of weapon systems acquisition with government-sponsored 
research and development: namely, initial design, development, and initial production stages. The 
item to be procured is either a well defined object or some well specified function to be performed so 
that the unit price is the only evaluation criterion used in the competition. One unit of t.'Ie item is 
1. "Breakout'' is a term that refers to the starting of competition in a procurement program. 
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procured in each of the two phases. 
The economic circumstances are characterized by a small number of potential suppliers, 
some of whom may have commercial operations parallel to govermnent business, each having 
private information about cost conditions and technology. The contracts are let using sealed-bid 
auctions (first-price or second-price). Participants make private R&D investments prior to the 
procurement auction which determines what it will cost them to produce the procurement item in 
case they win the auction. Average private R&D levels and average procurement costs are observed 
over a number of independent procurement programs. The following sourcing rules are used: 
1. sole sourcing (multi-year contracting) 
2. second sourcing with govermnent data rights 
Sole sourcing, as we use the term, differs from the way it is used in general procurement 
practice. In practice, after a supplier is selected in the initial procurement phase, the contract price 
is renegotiated before each of the subsequent production runs start and therefore is determined 
through bilateral bargaining at each stage. In the experimental set up, the initial phase auction 
winner is paid the same price for the additional unit he produces in the reprocurement phase. This 
can be interpreted either as the supplier having a particular "bargaining power" in the renegotiation 
stage, or simply as commitment by the buyer so that renegotiation does not take place. Before the 
production of a second unit begins the supplier can engage in additional investment activities to 
further reduce his unit production cost below the level of initial phase production cost. 
Under second sourcing, also called competitive reprocurement, the supplier in the 
reprocurement phase is determined by holding an auction for the second unit to be procured. Before 
the auction is held, each potential supplier may make an investment to further reduce his/her unit 
production cost below its level in the initial phase. The feature of govermnent data rights is 
operationalized by making the technology of the initial phase supplier to all potential suppliers in the 
reprocurement phase, which means the reprocurcment phase production cost of any potential 
supplier cannot be higher than the initial phase production cost of the initial phase supplier. 
The participants' earnings depended on the decisions they made in two markets, Market 1 
and Market 2, in a sequence of sessions. Each session consisted of two periods corresponding to the 
initial procurement phase and reprocurement phase, respectively. In each session twelve participants 
were randomly matched in four groups with three sellers in each group. Sellers in each group did 
not know the identities of the other two sellers in their group in any session. This was intended to 
prevent additional complications such as collusion and reputation building which would otherwise 
be more like! y to arise. 
In Market 1, one unit of an object was bought from one of the three potential sellers using a 
sealed-bid first-price auction procedure. The timing of decisions in Market 1 is given in Figure 1. A 
seller's unit production cost is determined as a random function of the level of investment that he/she 
undertakes prior to the auction. In the absence of any investment, unit production cost is some fixed 
number c·. Costs could conceivably be as low as c. as a result of the seller's decision to undertake 
R&D. However, the outcome of R&D is uncertain. Each unit of R&D gives rise to a production 
cost figure between c. and c· according to a fixed probability law F. The higher the R&D outlay 
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the more likely it is for the supplier to have a low production cost. Also, there are "diminishing 
returns" to R&D in the sense that each additional urtit of R&D gives on average lower reduction in 
expected production cost. For each urtit of investment the seller pays a fixed price m. The value to 
the buyer of each urtit is some amount greater than the highest possible production cost (C' ). 
There are several possible interpretations of the R&D investment in this setting. It may be 
interpreted as the number of independent projects pursued by the supplier to aim at the same cost-
reducing innovation, as the size of the research staff hired by the firm, or as the number of lottery 
tickets the outcome of each being a realization of a random production cost, or simply as the size of 
a random sample drawn from a fixed distribution with replacement. The supplier's production cost 
is the lowest cost among the rani! om outcomes of the investment urtits he/she has undertaken. Since 
the price per unit of investment is fixed at the same level for all experiments, a decision on the level 
of R&D intensity is equivalent to a decision on the level of R&D expenditures. The production costs 
are "private" in the sense that those elements of production cost which are common to all potential 
suppliers are, without loss of generality, normalized to zero. The randomness of the research 
outcomes is taken to be such that every possible level of production cost is equally likely for a each 
unit of investment; i.e., F is the uniform distribution on [C., C']. 
The potential suppliers simultaneously decide the level of investment they would like to 
make by paying m per unit of investment. Each seller knows his/her production cost privately. 
After the sellers make their investment decisions the investment decisions are publicly announced in 
each group. Then sellers are asked to submit their bids. The seller who submitted the lowest bid in 
each group gets to supply one unit and is paid his/her bid for the unit. No bid above c' is accepted 
in the first period. 
In the second phase under sole sourcing an additional unit is bought from the sellers who 
won the auction in the initial phase in each ofthe four groups. Each of these sellers is paid his/her 
initial phase bid for this additional unit. The seller's second period production cost is equal to either 
his/her first period production cost or, if he undertakes any investment in the second phase, the 
minimum of the second phase research outcomes, whichever is lower. 
Under second sourcing with government data rights, the procedure in the second phase is the 
same as in the initial phase except for the determination of second phase production costs. In this 
case, after the initial phase is over, the initial phase production cost of the initial phase auction 
winner is announced publicly in each group. The second phase production cost of each bidder is the 
minimum of his/her initial phase production cost and the initial phase production cost of the initial 
phase auction winner in his/her group, if a seller docs not make any investment. Sellers can further 
reduce their production costs by making additional investment under the same conditions as in the 
initial phase. Bids for the second unit arc submitted after the sellers observe their second phase 
production costs privately, and the investment decisions arc publicly announced in each group. 
No bid above the initial phase production cost of the initial phase winner is accepted in the 
second phase. 
Market 2 corresponds to the commercial market. This market has implicit demand and cost 
characteristics which correspond to a per period profit level of R 1 for a supplier if he/she is the only 
supplier, R 2 for each supplier if there arc two suppliers and R 3 per supplier if there are three 
suppliers. These values of R 1, R 2, and R 3 arc related by the fact that they correspond to the 
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symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium payoffs in a quantity setting game among one, two, and three 
players, respectively. 
At the beginning of each session, one supplier in each group is randomly chosen to be the 
monopoly supplier in Market2, and he/she is called the incumbent. The other two potential sellers 
in the group have the option of spendmg some "effort" to try to enter the commercial market. 
Whether or not these two sellers can enter the market depends on the random outcome of the R&D 
investment they make in Market2. Each unit of R&D results in a "success" with probability q, and 
in a "failure" with probability (I - q ). R&D in the commercial market costs s 1 per unit. If the 
outcome of any investment unit undertaken by a seller is a "success" then that seller can enter 
Market 2, and receives a payment of R 2 or R 3 in the initial phase depending on the outcome of the 
investment undertaken by the remaining seller. That is, the commercial market is shared by the 
incumbent and the sellers whose R&D investments result in a "success." The more a seller spends 
on R&D the more likely it is to hit a "success," and thereby to enter the market. Sellers who enter 
Market2 in the initial phase remain in Market2 in the second phase. Sellers who could not enter in 
the initial phase may make an additional investment in the second phase to try to enter in the second 
phase. The price per unit of investment in the second phase is different under sole sourcing and 
second sourcing. Under sole sourcing the unit price of investment in the second phase, s 2, is the 
same as in the initial phase; i.e., s 1 = s2• Under second sourcing with government data rights, if the 
seller who is the incumbent supplier in Market 2 wins the initial phase procurement auction in 
Market 1, it becomes "easier" for the other two sellers to enter the commercial market in the second 
phase, in the sense that sampling cost in Market 2 in period 2 is reduced to s; which is less than s2• 
Otherwise, it remains the same as in period I. If one keeps the unit cost of R&D at the same level, 
this is equivalent to each unit of R&D investment becoming more likely to result in a success. 
The sellers make their investment decisions in the two markets simultaneously. 
Experiments 
A total of eight experiments were conducted. Four experiments were run under each of the 
two sourcing rules. In each experiment twelve subjects participated. At the beginning of each 
experiment the subjects were given some initial cash which they could use for investment in the two 
markets during the experiment2 
In experiments lA, 2A, 3A, and 4A sole sourcing was used, and in IB, 2B, 3B, and 4B 
second sourcing was used. In experiment set I, experiments lA and JB, forty sessions of the basic 
design were conducted, and in each of the experiment sets 2, 3, and 4, twenty-five sessions of the 
basic design were conducted. Each session consisted of four parallel procurement programs on 
which three bidders submitted bids. Average private R&D levels and average procurement costs arc 
observed over a number of independent nondevelopment procurement programs. Therefore, we 
have obtained observations on 160 independent programs under each sourcing rule in experiment set 
2. All subjects were illldcrgraduate students at California Institute of Technology. Each experiment took about two hours 
to complete on average. Experiments were conducted using special software at the computer network at Caltech Economics 
and Political Science Laboratory. 
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1, and on 100 independent programs under each sourcing rule in each of the experiment sets 2, 3, 
and4. 
In experiment sets 2, 3, and 4, the sole sourcing and second sourcing parts were run in 
sequence using the same pool of subjects. In experiment set 1, the sole sourcing and second 
sourcing parts were conducted on different dates and some of the subjects were different in the two 
parts. The same experimental parameters were used in each of the last three sets of experiments. 
The sequence of the two parts of these sets was second sourcing-sole sourcing, sole sourcing-second 
sourcing, and second sourcing-sole sourcing in sets 2, 3, and 4, respectively. 
The parameters used in the experiments are given in Table 2. These parameters are common 
to all experiments. The only exception is that in experiment lA, sole sourcing, Market 2 was not 
incorporated, and the values R 1, R 2, and R 3 were different from the ones in the other experiments. 
Figure 2 depicts the expected production costs together with one standard deviation band 
around the expected cost for each level of investment expenditure. Also in Figure 2 is the mean of 
production costs for each level of investment expenditure based on the random numbers that were 
used in the experiments. 
THEORIES 
According to game theoretic principles, the common feature of the potentially self-defeating 
effects of second sourcing derive from the interaction of incentives and strategic responses of the 
participants. We illustrate the possible workings of strategic principles in a simple example. 
An Example 
Suppose two potential suppliers, say A and B, engage in private research and development 
activity before they enter bids in a government procurement auction. The auction winner gets to 
supply the item on a sole-source basis for the entire life of the program (say two periods) and gets 
paid his bid for the item in both periods. In Figure I the timing of the decisions is depicted. 
A policy which makes the technology of the first period winner available to all participants 
in the second period will reduce the cost of reprocurement, andean be advocated on economic 
efficiency grounds when one evaluates such a policy in period I. Also suppose, for purposes of the 
example that one of the potential sellers, say A, is the exclusive supplier of an object which uses a 
similar technology in a commercial market, and that it is too costly forB to try to discover A's 
technology in the commercial market. Again, it is intuitively clear that making A's technology 
available to B in the commercial market would increase price competition and lower prices in that 
market. It can be argued that second sourcing with data-rights provisions will achieve more 
competition and lower prices in A's commercial market if A is the first-period winner since the 
technology A uses for the procurement item reveals his technology in the commercial market. 
So far, it looks as if we have a policy which gets two birds with one stone. One might think 
that the policy would result in lower prices in both the commercial market and the government 
procurement contract. However, a careful consideration of strategic responses of A and B will 
reveal that the policy will not only fail to improve efficiency in the commercial market but also will 
increase procurement cost in the government auction. The reason is that A would simply not 
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participate in the first period government auction if the difference between the value of being the 
exclusive supplier and the value of being one of two suppliers in the commercial market is 
sufficient! y high, since winning in the first period would mean the loss of his/her commercial market 
in period 2, thereby leaving B the sole supplier in period I. As A never wins in the first period 
he/she remains the exclusive supplier in his/her commercial market. Moreover, as B is the sole 
bidder on the government procurement contract in period I and he/she anticipates the competition in 
the rcprocurement stage, he will not only bid as high as the market will bear in the first period but 
will also invest less in cost reduction activities since he/she expects lower returns in the second 
period than he/she would get under sole sourcing. 
Even if the value of the commercial market is not so high as to warrant A's dropping out of 
the procurement auction, the seller A would increase his bid in the first period by the amount he 
stands to lose in the commercial market in case he wins the auction. This, probably, is obvious. 
What is probably not so obvious at first sight is that seller B would do exactly the same because by 
winning the auction instead of letting A win in the first period he would be forgoing a share of the 
commercial market in the second period and, thus, his bid will reflect this foregone opportunity. 
Now consider the case where both sellers have private commercial marlcets part of which 
they stand to lose if their technology is made available to others. Similar reasoning would reveal 
that both sellers would bid as if their production costs have increased by the full value of their 
commercial market, that is, by about twice the amount they stand to lose in their respective 
commercial markets (Giiler 1988). 
Implications of Game Theoretic Analysis 
Second sourcing has three independent effects under circumstances where private R&D is an 
important factor and potential sellers' cnmmcrcial markets are rendered vulnerable by data-rights 
requirements. The first two effects are similar to the ones discussed in the Riordan and Sappington 
(1988) study of second sourcing under different assumptions. The next effect is independent of the 
first two and is due to the existence of private commercial markets. The first two effects are closely 
related to the ratchet effect in the planning literature. Although this tendency to shift investment to 
future, until the return to investing the marginal unit now and to investing it later is equalized, exists 
under both rules, due to the sequential search aspect of the investment decision problem, second 
sourcing induces additional incentives for an agent to shift effort to the second phase where the 
results of such effort cannot be used against him/her. These incentives arc kept in check by the 
existence of rivals and initial period rewards. Such incentives arc nonexistent under sole sourcing. 
1. Sellers would anticipate the reduction in potential profits in the future and invest less in R&D 
than under sole source, which gives rise to higher average cost for every potential seller. 
2. For every given level of production cost for the seller, the prospect of reduced future return 
causes every bidder to bid less aggressively in the initial procurement stage than under sole 
source. 
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3. With data-rights provisions, sellers with commercial markets, which may be adversely affected if 
they win the auction in the initial procurement phase, completely drop out of the auction in the 
initial phase if the value of commercial operations relative to the profit they expect in the 
procurement market is high enough. This results in fewer sellers in the initial procurement phase 
and higher initial period procurement cost on average. We call this a competition-reduction 
effect. 
When the value of commercial operations is not high enough to warrant dropping out of the 
procurement market in the initial procurement phase, the sellers with commercial markets will 
invest less and bid less aggressively than the sellers without commercial markets. In addition to 
this direct reduction in competition, sellers without commercial marlcets, anticipating the less 
aggressive investment and bidding behavior of the sellers with commercial markets, may in turn 
bid less aggressively in the initial procurement phase than they would otherwise do. An 
additional incentive for the sellers without commercial markets to bid less aggressively in the 
initial procurement phase is that if they bid high enough so that a seller with a commercial 
market wins the first-period auction, they will be obtaining potential access to a valuable 
commercial market by obtaining the technical data in the reprocurement phase. 
Although there remain important basic research problems to be solved to characterize all the 
possibilities under second sourcing systematically, one can specify the parameters describing the 
economic circumstances so that all the above effects are generated as part of equilibrium behavior. 
All these effects work in the direction of increasing initial procurement costs. The question 
is whether or not this increase more than offsets the lower cost in the reprocurement stage. 
The analysis above suggests that so long as some procurement programs involve potential 
sellers who engage in private R&D and have related commercial markets which may be affected 
adversely under the second sourcing with data-rights policy, blanket application of the policy 
without regard to the specific features of the program at hand may result in just the opposite of 
intended policy goals. 
The analysis also suggests situations in which a "competition in contracting" policy may or 
may not be an effective policy in reducing procurement costs. Competition in contracting initiatives 
seems to be dominated by concerns about the number of potential sellers at date 2 in Figure I; that 
is, at the reprocuremcnt stage. In fact, this is the stated goal of government data-rights initiative: 
"The Government must make technical data widely available in the form of contract specifications in 
the interest of increasing competition, lowering costs, and providing for mobilization by developing 
and locating alternate sources of supply and manufacture" (Federal Register 1987). However, as the 
example suggests, in certain environments, the question of "when to use competition" is a crucial 
one. In many situations, a competition in contracting initiative designed to increase the number of 
potential sellers at date 0 would improve procurement costs, whereas the same initiative directed at a 
later stage in the procurement cycle would be self-defeating. In this connection, government data-
rights policy, which is stated to be an aid to increasing competition in the rcprocurement stage, 
would cause less competition at the initial stage when competition really counts. Although 
competition-in-contracting initiatives also contain measures to increase competition in the initial 
phase (e.g., publication of intended procurement programs in advance to direct private industry for 
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future procurement), these measures may be rendered ineffective by second-sourcing and 
government data-rights provisions. 
Implications for the Standard Methodology 
In view of the above discussion, if there is no reason to believe that strategic factors are 
either nonexistent or negligible then the empirical methodology used in measuring the effectiveness 
of second sourcing is seriously flawed. A proper comparison of sole-sourcing and second-sourcing 
policies requires data which cannot be obtained from historical sources simply because the two 
policies are mutually exclusive, and hence one would never directly observe what the price would 
have been under the alternative policy. Theory must be used to reconstruct from the data "what 
might have been" and if the theory is inadequate the conclusions from the study can be wrong. 
A cross-sectional comparison of total procurement costs across programs that are similar in 
all "relevant" aspects except the sourcing rule is virtually impossible with field data due to the broad 
diversity of procurement programs. Even if such programs could be found, because of the inherent 
randomness in the environment, one would need a large data set of such programs to single out the 
systematic effects of sourcing rules before one can have any confidence on the estimates obtained. 
Procurement programs studied in empirical work differ widely with respect to not only the 
underlying supply conditions but also the types of contracts used. Because of this and because of the 
mutual exclusivity of the two sourcing rules, most empirical studies had to rely on assumptions. 
These assumptions were used to "extrapolate" from the data on prices and/or costs in the pre-
breakout phase of acquisition programs procured under second sourcing to obtain predictions for the 
prices that would have been obtained had these programs been sole sourced. 
Standard procedure is to compare tl1e predictions for the price that would have prevailed 
under sole sourcing to the price observed under second sourcing. "Saving" due to competitive 
reprocurement is calculated as 
Saving = 100 ( P~~- P 2s) I P, 
where 
P, = unit price under sole sourcing 
P 2s = unit price under second sourcing 
In empirical work, P, is replaced by an estimate, EP,, based on prices (or costs) observed in 
the initial procurement phase. All except one of the studies surveyed in Anton and Yao (l987b) 
consider only unit prices in the reprocurement phase under the two policies as opposed to unit prices 
based on overall program costs in their estimation of savings due to second sourcing. Predictions for 
the reprocurement price that would have prevailed had sole sourcing continued are obtained by 
extrapolation from the prices (or costs) observed in the initial procurement phase. 
The measure itself and the way it is estimated in empirical studies both reflect a fundamental 
assumption implicit in the studies: 
Strategic Neutrality : in the absence of learning curve effects, the reprocurement price under 
sole sourcing would be approximately the same as the price in the initial procurement phase under 
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second sourcing. Furthermore, price in the initial procurement phase would not be systematically 
affected by the strategic responses of the sellers to the possibility of breakout in later phases. 
The proposition is that observed magnitudes are not affected by the strategic behavior of the 
buyer or the sellers. The key assumption is that agents do not respond strategically to changes in the 
economic environment. Although this assumption is not made explicitly in all of the empirical 
evaluations of second sourcing, from the point of view of modern economic theory, validity of both 
the evaluation measure used and the way this measure is estimated from field data depends crucially 
on this assumption. 
Violation of the assumption of strategic neutrality; i.e., existence of strategic behavior on 
either side of the procurement market, has important implications for the validity of both the 
measure used to evaluate alternative sourcing rules, and the procedures employed to get an estimate 
of this measure. 
With regard to the strategic responses on the buyer side, first of all, the validity of the 
measure itself, regardless of how it is estimated, depends on the implicit assumption that quantities 
purchased are independent of price, that is, the buyer does not respond strategically by purchasing 
different quantities when faced with different prices. If, as it is generally the case, quantity 
purchased increases with lower prices then the benefits oflower prices are underestimated by the 
measure. This underestimation is a consequence of the failure of the model to incorporate 
behavioral and strategic responses within the procurement process. 
The second implication of strategic behavior on the buyer side is for the validity of the 
usual practice of estimating the evaluation measure from field data on programs procured under 
second sourcing. Suppose the buyer decides the choice of sourcing mode in the reprocurement phase 
on the basis of price obtained in the initial procurement phase. For example, the buyer might 
introduce competition in the reprocurement phase only if the price in the initial phase is high-as is 
seen to be the standard practice in defense procurement (Anton and Yao 1987a). Such strategic 
behavior will cause the saving measure to be overestimated because of the sample selection problem. 
Strategic neutrality on the seller side implies that the prices in the initial procurement phase 
are "not very different from those that would have prevailed if it were known that there would be no 
competition overthe entire life of the project" (Anton and Yao 1987b). This has two implications 
both of which would amount to an overestimation of the benefits of second sourcing. On the one 
hand, the ranking of the two sourcing rules on the basis of the savings measure which is based on 
tlle rcprocurement phase prices only, as opposed to total program cost over the two phases, may be 
exactly opposite of the ranking obtained when one considers total program costs. That is, usual 
saving measures employed in the empirical evaluations would be invalid. On the other hand, the 
practice of estimating "what the price would have been under sole sourcing" using the price or cost 
data on second-sourced programs would clearly be invalid. 
The major criticism of the standard approach has been the paucity of data used to estimate 
the learning curve. Little attention lws been paid to the implications of the underlying assumption 
implicit in this approach. In the analysis that follows we test this theoretical proposition directly, 
and demonstrate the implications of its violation for tlle accurdcy of evaluation measures based on 
the standard empirical approach. 
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The programs in the experiments are identical in every aspect-same number of sellers, 
same research environment in terms of research costs and the inherent randomness of research 
outcomes, same type of contracts (fixed price), same supplier selection procedure (first-price 
auction), etc. One unit of the procurement item is procured in each phase. The two experiments 
differ only in sourcing rule. Thus, in the laboratory setting we can overcome the difficulties with 
field data mentioned above in attempting a cross-sectional comparison. Fixing procurement quantity 
in each phase, auction and contract type, and sourcing mode allow us to abstract from strategic 
behavior on the buyer side and focus on the implications of strategic behavior on the seller side only. 
1n this setting, there are no "learning curve effects." In general, learning curve effects are 
related to production experience gained during initial phase production: the unit production cost 
decreases as more production is undertaken by a supplier. Although originally offered to argue that 
comparison of procurement costs before and after competition is introduced in a procurement 
program would lead to a bias in favor of second sourcing because of "learning by doing" during the 
process of production (Anton And Yao 1987b), the way it is employed in empirical work "learning" 
is better interpreted to result from research undertaken by the supplier parallel to production rather 
than from mere production activity. In either case, the effect oflearning would result in a cost 
advantage for the initial supplier over the potential competitors in the reprocurement phase. In the 
setting we consider learning curve effects are nonexistent in either sense. Also, the direct costs of 
technology transfer to the second source (technology transfer, duplicated capital, start-up costs) are 
taken to be zero. This is certainly the most favorable setting for second sourcing in terms of the 
factors held to be of fundamental importance in empirical analyses. 
PREDICTIONS AND EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
Multiplicity of equilibria is a common feature of the type of procurement environments 
where private investtuent is undertaken prior to the auctioning of contracts. Existence of multiple 
equilibria under either sourcing rule makes it difficult to obtain point predictions on some 
magnitudes of interest. Also, the equilibrium comparison of the two sourcing rules becomes 
dependent on the choice of equilibria under the two rules. Most of the predictions below depend on 
the assumption of symmetric equilibrium behavior, although at some asymmetric equilibria the 
predictions may be reversed. However, deviations from symmetric equilibrium behavior seems not 
to be large enough to affect general qualitative predictions significantly. 
Four series of qualitative predictions on various observable magnitudes based on 
considerations of strategic behavior under ti1e conditions characterized by the experimental 
parameters are presented.' The first set of predictions are on the comparative procurement price paid 
by the buyer under the two sourcing rules. 
3. We do not intend these different predictions and tests as independent evidence on the relative merits of the two 
sourcing rules, but as an indication of the general principles discussed above in organizing various aspects of the 
experimental observations in a coherem whole. Due to obvious dependencies among the prOJXJSitions involved a joint test 
of all the hypotheses would have less "power" than indicated by separate tests. 
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l.a Initial phase procurement price is lower under sole sourcing than under second sourcing. 
l.b Reprocurement phase procurement price is higher under sole sourcing than under second 
sourcing. 
I.e Average procurement price over the two phases is lower under sole sourcing than under second 
sourcing. 
Figure 3.0 summarizes the above predictions. Figures 3.1 to 3.4 give the estimates for A, B 
and C obtained from two experiments in experiment sets 1 through 4. In each panel, prices in the 
initial procurement phase and in the reprocurement phase are averaged over 100 (160 for experiment 
set 1) independent nondevelopment programs. In the left panels in Figures 3.1 to 3.4, the average 
price under sole sourcing is given, and in the right panel average prices in the initial procurement 
phase and in the reprocurement phase are given: although average reprocurement price is lower 
under second sourcing, this reduction in reprocurement price is more than offset by the increase in 
the initial procurement prices. 
Figures 4.1 through 4.4 contain the time series of average procurement prices over the two 
phases under the two sourcing rules. Each data point is the mean price of four independent 
programs. 
Table 3 contains !-statistics for the null hypotheses that mean value of the initial phase, 
reprocurement phase, and average price under sole sourcing is equal to the mean value under second 
sourcing for four sets of experiments. Each of these null hypotheses is rejected in favor of the 
corresponding alternative hypotheses in the predictions above. 
Table 4 contains the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon statistics for the null hypotheses that the 
distribution of initial phase, reprocurement phase and average prices under sole sourcing is the same 
as the distribution of corresponding prices under second sourcing. These statistics are normally 
distributed under the corresponding null hypotheses. The results support the above predictions 
interpreted in the first order stochastic dominance sense. 
Next, we present similar predictions on the investment expenditures under the two sourcing 
rules. These predictions, in addition to being of independent interest as direct implications of 
strategic principles, also help explain the regularities observed when we looked at the procurement 
prices above. 
2.a Initial phase investment expenditures are higher under sole sourcing than under second 
sourcing. 
2.b Reprocurement phase investment expenditures are lower under sole sourcing than under second 
sourcing. 
2.c Average investment expenditure over the two phases is higher under sole sourcing than under 
second sourcing. 
Prediction 2.b follows from the fact that expected investment level in the second phase is 
decreasing in the initial phase investment level at equilibrium and that initial investment level is 
higher under sole sourcing. However, for any given level of total investment over the two phases, 
the buyer would prefer more of it undertaken in the initial phase. 
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Figures 5.1 through 5.4 contain the time series of average investment expenditures over the 
two phases, and Figures 6.1 through 6.4 contain the time series of investment expenditures in the 
initial procurement phase. 
In Table 5 the statistics fortesting significance of the difference between corresponding 
investment expenditures under the two sourcing rules are given. In general, the signs of the 
t-statistics are in agreement with the corresponding predictions. However, the difference is 
statistically insignificant in experiment set 1. 
Results based on the nonparametric tests in Table 6 are also in conformity with !-tests in 
Table 5. 
The last set of predictions and tests concern comparative investment and bidding behavior of 
sellers with commercial markets and those without commercial markets under each sourcing rule. 
Although it is not possible to isolate the workings of different factors which are discussed under 
effect 3 above in the observed bidding behavior of the sellers with commercial markets, the 
combined effect of all these factors is in the predicted direction. 
Given the experimental parameters , equilibrium investment level is zero in Market 2 when 
the sampling cost is s 1• When sampling cost in Market 2 is s;, there is positive investment by the 
nonincumbents in equilibrium which implies a positive expected loss to the incumbent if he wins the 
auction in the initial phase. That is, existence of commercial markets introduces an asymmetry 
between the initial phase behavior of the two seller types under second sourcing. This observation is 
the basis ofthefollowing set of qualitative predictions: 
3.a Under sole sourcing, initial phase bidding behavior of sellers with commercial markets does not 
differ significantly from that of sellers without commercial markets. 
3.b Under second sourcing , sellers with commercial markets bid higher in the initial phase than the 
sellers without commercial marketo. 
3.c Under second sourcing. reprocurement phase bidding behavior of sellers with commercial 
markets does not differ significantly from that of sellers without commercial markets. 
4.a Under sole sourcing, initial pllasc investment behavior of sellers with commercial markets docs 
not differ significantly from that of sellers without commercial markets. 
4.b Under second sourcing, sellers with commercial markets invest less in the initial phase than the 
sellers without commercial markets. 
4.c Under either sourcing rule, rcprocurcment pllase investment behavior of sellers with 
commercial markets does not differ significantly from that of sellers without commercial 
markets. 
Experimental results in general agree with these predictions. Panels A in Figures 7.l.B 
through 7.4.B contain the time series of average initial phase bid by the four sellers who have 
commercial markets, and Panels B contain the time series of initial phase bids by eight sellers 
without commercial markets. Table 7 contains nonparametric test statistics for testing the null 
hypothesis that tile distribution of corresponding bids is the same for both types of sellers. As 
predicted one cannot reject the null hypothesis of same bid distribution for the cases predicted, 
namely initial phase under sole sourcing, and reprocurement phase under second sourcing. The null 
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hypothesis that initial phase bid distribution is same for both type of sellers under second sourcing is 
rejected in favorofthe alternative hypothesis that sellers with commercial markets bid less 
aggressively than those without commercial markets. The following comparison of initial phase 
investment expenditures across the two seller types provides an explanation for this phenomenon, 
namely, that sellers with commercial markets invest less in the initial phase and thus have higher 
production costs. 
In Panels A in Figures 8.1.B through 8.4.B, time series of average initial phase investment 
expenditures by the four sellers with commercial markets is presented. Panels B contain the same 
data for the eight sellers without commercial markets. Nonparametric test statistics for the null 
hypotheses that the corresponding distributions of initial and reprocurement phase investment 
expenditures by sellers with and without commercial markets do not differ significantly are given in 
Table 8. Again, predictions concerning the distribution of reprocurement phase investment 
expenditures are consistent with the test results. Regarding the predictions concerning the initial 
phase investment behavior, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the distribution of investment by 
sellers with commercial markets and those without is the same under second sourcing for experiment 
1. For experiments 2, 3, and 4 the null hypothesis that the two distributions are the same is rejected 
in favor of the alternative hypothesis which corresponds to the predictions. In experiments 2 and 3 , 
under sole sourcing, the null hypothesis that the distribution of initial phase investment expenditures 
is the same for both types of sellers is rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis that sellers with 
commercial markets invest more in the initial phase than the other sellers. 
A Test of Standard Methodology 
In view of the analysis above, the assumption of strategic neutrality is clearly violated. The 
experimental data indicate the existence of the effects predicted by game theoretical models but are 
implicitly assumed to be nonexistent by the standard methodology. If the effects are on the order of 
the magnitude predicted by theory then we know that empirical methods must be changed to 
accommodate the existence of these effects. As will be shown below the effects are sizable enough 
to cause applications of the standard methodology to lead to the wrong decision regarding the 
benefits of second sourcing relative to sole sourcing. 
The purpose of this section is to assess the accuracy of the standard methodology for 
measuring the success of competitive reprocuremcnt. The strategy is to apply the standard 
methodology to the procurement and reprocuremcnt activities that were created under laboratory 
conditions. Estimates of procurement price saving due to competitive reprocurement as opposed to 
sole sourcing were obtained from the methodology. These estimates were then compared to the 
measures based on actual prices which were directly observable by virtue of the controlled 
conditions. One major conclusion can be drawn from the exercise: the standard methodology 
should not be applied indiscriminately. Under certain conditions the methodology can lead to errors. 
The exercise exposed two different errors. The first was in the measurement of overall 
program cost, which is the proper measurement for program evaluation. The actual effect of second 
sourcing was to increase program cost by about 40 percent over the cost of sole sourcing. Estimates 
based on the standard methodology were substantially in error. According to these estimates second 
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sourcing led to a reduction of about 30 percent in program cost instead of tbe actual increase. 
The second error involved tbe narrower issue of reprocurement prices. The standard 
metbodology led to tbe estimate tbat price in tbe reprocurement phase would be reduced by over 60 
percent from what would have prevailed under sole sourcing. In fact tbe reprocurement prices were 
only 30 percent lower. Thus tbe standard methodology led to an answer tbat was off by a factor of 
two. Of course tbis error is related to tbe first since overly optimistic estimates of prices at tbe 
reprocurement phase are weighed with the impact of second sourcing in earlier phases in the 
calculation of the overall program cost. 
In Figure 3.0, the assumption of strategic neutrality above amounts to tbe claim tbat A =B. 
The assumption is tbat price under sole source (A) would have been tbe same as tbe price for tbe 
initial phase of second sourcing (B). 
Figures 3.1 to 3.4 give tbe estimates for A , B, and C obtained from experiments sets I 
through 4. Although average reprocurement price is lower under second sourcing, this reduction in 
reprocurement price is more than offset by tbe increase in the initial procurement prices. 
A number of observations on the validity of tbe standard procedure in empirical evaluations 
of competitive reprocurement can be made using tbe data from tbe experiments: 
1. Even when one considers only tbe reprocurement prices under tbe two sourcing rules as tbe basis 
for evaluation, the procedure used in empirical studies gives a systematic overprediction of 
savings due to competitive reprocurement. The estimates of price reduction in tbe reprocurement 
phase are given in tbe left panels in Figures 9.1 through 9.4. Following tbe standard model 
(strategic neutrality) tbese estimates are based on the assumption tbat, under sole sourcing, tbe 
reprocurement price would be the same as the price observed in tbe initial phase (since there are 
no learning curve effects in the experimental set up and all programs use fixed price contracts). 
According to these measures second sourcing reduces rcprocurement cost by about 65 percent on 
average. If, however, actual rcprocuremcnt cost under sole sourcing is used in the savings 
measure, reprocurement price reduction due to second sourcing is about 30 percent (panels Bin 
Figures 9.1 through 9.4). That is, the procedure used in empirical studies gives an estimate of 
savings more than twice the actual reprocurernent price reduction. 
2. When one considers the total program costs underthe two policies (Figures 10.1 through 10.4), 
the distortion is even more dramatic. Using the standard procedure, one gets an estimate of over 
30 percent reduction in unit prices over the entire life of the programs (panels A in Figures 10.1 
tl1rough 10.4), whereas using actual average cost obtained under sole sourcing, one concludes 
tl1at second sourcing increases procurement cost by over 40 percent on average. 
Table 9 and Figures 11.1 through 11.4 summarize the evaluations based on the two 
procedures. Panels A in the figures summarize the results of applying the standard methodology to 
measure the effect of competitive reprocurement on: 
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I. initial procurement price, 
II. reprocurement price, and 
III. unit price over the entire program life. 
In the right panels , the same measures are obtained by using actual price data under sole 
sourcing. Comparison across the panels also reveals the culprit for the distortion. It is the 
assumption of strategic neutrality above. If measurements are based on the theory implied by this 
assumption then these measurements necessarily overestimate the effectiveness of second sourcing 
and can clearly give the wrong qualitative conclusion. In fact the wrong answer is given in an 
environment which is most favorable to second sourcing according to the theory which underlies this 
methodology. Using the implicit theory of procurement that underlies this methodology one would 
conclude that second sourcing significantly reduces procurement costs whereas the actual fact is that 
it does exactly the opposite. 
CONCLUSIONS AND CA YEATS 
As Anton and Yao (1987b) point out "the first priority for empirical work is to identify some 
of the fundamental properties of the underlying economic structure of the procurement problem." 
The issues studied in modem theoretical models (strategic behavior, infonnational asymmetries, etc.) 
are among those fundamental features of the economics of procurement. Experimental data clearly 
demonstrate that the effects of tlwse factors are real, and that theories which incorporate these factors 
as fundamental features of the procurement problem help us understand the systematic differences 
observed in labcratory markets. Theories which assume these factors to be insignificant have no 
explanation for the observations. 
Previous studies of second sourcing in the procurement context (Anton and Yao 1987a; 
Riordan and Sappington 1988; Rob 1986; Demski et al. 1987) have identified several effects which 
determine "costs" and "benefits" of second sourcing. 
On the benefit side one has the three effects discussed in Riordan and Sappington (1988). 
1. Price reduction effect: second sourcing reduces reprocurement cost. 
2. Production enhancement effect: second sourcing allows production which would not occur 
under sole source. This effect works as in Demski et al. ( 1987) through enhancing the auditing 
capability of the buyer. This effect does not exist in the experimental setting since the quantity 
decisions are exogenously fixed in both phases of procurement. 
3. Production diversion effect: production is undertaken by different producers. 
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On the cost side one has 
1. direct cost of transferring technology: this is the only cost considered in the empirical 
evaluations discussed above. In our setting we assumed it to be zero. 
Next we have effects due to the "linkages" between the phases of the procurement cycle and 
the strategic responses of the participants: 
2. R&D reduction effects: this is present in the context of both private R&D, as we have 
considered, and government sponsored R&D as in Riordan and Sappington (1988). 
3. Competition reduction effects 
a. Bidding behavior: second sourcing results in less aggressive bidding in the initial 
procurement phase. 
b. Number of bidders: second sourcing may cause some potential sellers to drop out in the 
initial procurement phase. 
How effective a policy second sourcing in general is will depend on the relative importance 
of the effects on the cost and benefit side of the policy. These will in tum depend on the relative 
importance of factors which cause these effects in the economic environment surrounding a 
particular procurement program. More basic research in economic theory can give insight into the 
finer details of the tradeoffs involved in the policy decision. Before a general economic theory of 
procurement policy incorporating all the relevant factors can be attempted, basic research on specific 
issues in the theories of auctions, contracts, and game theory is needed. 
To the extent that private R&D activity and the linkages between the commercial markets of 
potential sellers and the procurement market are essential features of given procurement programs, 
second sourcing is more likely to be a self-defeating policy. However, the extent and importance of 
private R&D and linkages to the commercial markets in the economic environment of a particular 
program cannot be assessed without empirical studies. 
Economic theory and experimental studies cannot go further than identifying the potential 
cost and benefit effects and the underlying factors which determine these effects, and testing whether 
these effects are "real" in the sense that they can be observed in simple laboratory environments 
where the underlying factors suspected to give rise to these effects are present. The final judgment 
on the effectiveness of a given policy for a given class of procurement programs would require 
empirical investigation of the existence and importance of these factors in the economic environment 
of the given procurement programs. 
However, even with limited study, what could be a deep organizational problem within 
current policy can be identified. Within a given procurement program, there is always incentive for 
the procuring agency to "break out" in the reprocurement stage if the decision on whether or not to 
break out is made and announced after the initial procurement stage is complete. When such 
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surprises are introduced, breakout will lower the cost of reprocurement below that which would 
otherwise occur. However, this potential lack of systematic commitment to process can be an 
impediment to increased competition and private R&D in the initial procurement stage. The fear of 
breakout operates much the same as second sourcing in the example and is derived from a 
governmental and organizational environment, where procurement agencies are encouraged to 
achieve a cost reduction for the remaining part of that particular program. The fact that agencies are 
evaluated on the basis of the number of programs in which they "compete," and "how much they 
reduce reprocurement costs" without regard to the way competition is introduced or the way that cost 
reductions are achieved are signals of the problem. The proper perspective to be used in evaluating 
policies is that of date zero in Figure I so that the effects of a policy on private R&D decisions and 
bidding behavior in the initial procurement phase is fully accounted for. 
While existing knowledge is far from complete, one conclusion is clearly emerging. 
Policies must reflect the diversity of acquisition programs in terms of the nature and size of the item 
being procured and the structure of the markets in which potential suppliers operate. Any policy 
based on the insights from a general theory which do not explicitly account for the idiosyncracies of 
particular acquisition programs could involve considerable costs if applied indiscriminately to all 
acquisition programs. 
The choice of assumptions allows identification of the qualitative effect of the chosen 
aspects of the economic circumstances on the performance of sourcing rules in a simple framework. 
For example, fixed-price contracts allow us to abstract from a host of additional problems such as 
characterization of the optimal contracts and characterization of auditing rules. Under the 
information conditions assumed (bidders know their production costs before they enter their bids) 
fixed-price contracts lead to efficient resource allocations. Under alternative information conditions 
and under contract types optimal for those conditions, second sourcing may be a valuable auditing 
device to discipline the seller (Demski eta!. 1987; Anton and Yao 1987a) and this is an important 
effect on the benefit side of second sourcing. Since the aim of this study is to identify effects 
independent of and in addition to the ones already discovered in literature, the simplest framework 
was chosen for this purpose. Once we identify all the important potential effects, judging the 
relative importance of these effects for a given class of procurement programs would be the subject 
of empirical investigations on the existence and relative magnitude of economic factors which give 
rise to these effects. 
Only two alternative policies were considered in this study. Therefore, the possibility exists 
that when one expands the set of policy alternatives to include combinations of policy options in 
other dimensions, a slightly altered policy of second sourcing might fare better. For example, sole 
sourcing together with cost plus incentive contracts auctioned via a first price auction with a reserve 
price p' could be considered along with second sourcing together with fixed price contracts 
auctioned via a second price auction with reserve price p". It is conceivable that second sourcing 
might be an essential part of the optimal procurement policy mix in certain economic environments. 
For a comparison of the best the buyer can do with second sourcing and the best he/she can do with 
sole sourcing when the options in other dimensions of the policy mix are chosen optimally, one 
needs a much more general analytical framework. Towards such a general framework, the present 
framework can be extended to cover variable quantities, optimal choice of the auction procedure and 
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the reserve price, and rules of reimbursement for research and development. The framework can 
also be extended to cover different specifications of research and development activity. These 
extensions are done in Giiler (1988) for the one-stage version of the problem. 
TABLE 1: Dimensions of the Procurement Problem 
Policy Options Performance Criteria Economic Circumstances 
• Supplier Selection Procedure •Cost •Number of 
-Auctions -to Seller Potential Suppliers 
-Sealed Bid -to Buyer 
- First Price -to Society •Nature of Program 
- Second Price -Size 
-Negotiation •Quality -Development or 
nondevelopment 
• Contract Type • Timeliness 
-Fixed Price •Information Conditions 
- Cost plus Fixed Fee • Research Level 
- Cost plus Incentive • Cost Dependence 
• Time Perspective - Private Costs 
• Sourcing Rule -LongRun - Common Costs 
-Sole Source (Multi- -Short Run 
Period Procurement) • Research Environment 
- Second Sourcing - Research Costs 
-Data-Rights Rule -Externalities 
-Government - b/w Markets 
Requirement - b/w Suppliers 
of Data Rights 
-Private • Existence of Commercial 
Data Rights Markets for Potential 
Suppliers 
• Possibility of Commiunent 
• Duration of the Seller-
Buyer Relationship 
-Repeated 
-One-shot 
• Possibility of 
Subcontracting 
TABLE 2: Experimental Parameters 
Market 1 
Experiment I. A I.B II. A II.B III.A III.B IV.A IV.B 
m 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 
c. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
c· 5000 5000 5000 5000 5000 5000 5000 5000 
Market2 
Experiment I. A I.B II. A II.B III. A III.B IV.A IV.B 
SJ 0 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 
s'2 0 50 250 50 250 50 250 50 
R1 0 5000 2500 2500 2500 2500 2500 2500 
Rz 0 2222 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111 
R3 0 1250 625 625 625 625 625 625 
q 0 .10 .10 .10 .10 .10 .10 .10 
TABLE 3: Average Procurement Price Under Sole Sourcing and Second Sourcing 
Sole Second 
Sourcing Sourcing Difference t* dof** 
Experiment I 
Initial Phase Mean .11463 .25484 -.14022 -9.86187 180 
Standard Deviation .04984 .17063 .01422 
Reprocurement Phase Mean .11463 .08169 .03293 4.43830 261 
Standard Deviation .04984 .07854 .00742 
Average .11463 .16827 -.05364 -5.73203 219 
Standard Deviation .04984 .10602 .00936 
Experiment II 
Initial Phase Mean .10906 .22719 -.11813 -10.82688 152 
Standard Deviation .05196 .09594 .01091 
Reprocurement Phase Mean .10906 .07589 .03317 3.82727 183 
Standard Deviation .05196 .06935 .00867 
Average .10906 .15154 -.04248 -4.82577 181 
Standard Deviation .05196 .07105 .00880 
Experiment III 
Initial Phase Mean .10347 .21734 -.11387 -6.21316 115 
Standard Deviation .05043 .17619 .01833 
Reprocurement Phase Mean .10347 .07208 .03140 4.33063 197 
Standard Deviation .05043 .05209 .00725 
Average .10347 .14471 -.04123 -3.74216 148 
Standard Deviation .05043 .09797 .01102 
Experiment IV 
Initial Phase Mean .10684 .21306 -.10622 -8.96716 124 
Standard Deviation .04050 .11131 .01185 
Reprocurement Phase Mean .10684 .08427 .02257 3.05708 170 
Standard Deviation .04050 .06173 .00738 
Average .10684 .14866 -.04182 -4.98963 154 
Standard Deviation .04050 .07338 .00838 
* t = t -statistic for the null hypothesis that the mean price under sole sourcing is the same as the 
mean price under second sourcing. 
** dof = degree of freedom. 
TABLE 4: Comparison of Procurement Prices under Sole Sourcing and Second Sourcing• 
Initial Procurement Reprocurement Total Program 
Experiment Price Price Cost 
I 
-10.20840 6.77467 -15.00799 
II -9.89821 5.38331 -5.46132 
III -7.24502 4.30339 -3.21941 
IV 
-8.85325 3.19173 -4.45957 
* The table entries are the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon statistics for the null hypothesis that the 
distribution of prices is the same under the two sourcing rules. 
TABLE 5: Average Investment Expenditure Under Sole Sourcing and Second Sourcing 
Sole Second 
Sourcing Sourcing Difference t* dof** 
Experiment I 
Initial Phase Mean .06402 .05918 .00484 1.87096 309 
Standard Deviation .02189 .02402 .00259 
Reprocurement Phase Mean .00814 .00695 .00119 .73987 302 
Standard Deviation .01295 .01541 .00160 
Average .03608 .03307 .00301 2.06932 304 
Standard Deviation .01192 .01386 .00146 
Experiment II 
Initial Phase Mean .09264 .07494 .01770 4.27923 183 
Standard Deviation .02479 .03310 .00414 
Reprocurement Phase Mean - .00390 .00938 -.00547 -4.29721 183 
Standard Deviation .00762 .01020 .00127 
Average .04827 .04216 .00611 3.02066 191 
Standard Deviation .01289 .01560 .00202 
Experiment III 
Initial Phase Mean .05946 .04349 .0!597 6.71524 193 
Standard Deviation .01803 .01550 .00238 
Reprocurement Phase Mean .00374 .01181 -.00806 -5.14664 150 
Standard Deviation .00732 .01385 .00157 
Average .03160 .02765 .00395 2.86294 197 
Standard Deviation .00955 .00997 .00138 
Experiment IV 
Initial Phase Mean .05818 .04211 .01606 10.43721 171 
Standard Deviation .00846 .01285 .00154 
Reprocurement Phase Mean .00278 .01325 -.01046 -5.91067 134 
Standard Deviation .00706 .01627 .00177 
Average .03048 .02768 .00280 2.35694 145 
Standard Deviation .00533 .01062 .00119 
* t = t -statistic for the null hypothesis that the mean investment level under sole sourcing is the 
same as the mean investment level under second sourcing. 
** dof = degree of freedom. 
TABLE 6: Comparison of Invesnnent Expenditure under Sole Sourcing and Second Sourcing* 
Invesnnent in the Invesnnent in the Total 
Experiment Initial Phase Reprocurement Phase Investment 
I 2.29669 0.97559 2.73797 
II 4.17268 -5.25278 3.30622 
III 6.32588 -4.81175 2.75867 
IV 8.36369 -5.55682 3.50395 
• The table entries are the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon statistics for the null hypothesis that the 
distribution of invesnnent levels is the same under the two sourcing rules. 
Experiment 
I 
II 
III 
IV 
TABLE 7: Comparison of Bids by Sellers with Commercial Markets 
and Sellers without Co=ercial Markets* 
Initial Phase Reprocurement Phase 
Sole Sourcing 
Second Sourcing 2.09819 .93792 
Sole Sourcing -.39959 
Second Sourcing 6.62848 1.15662 
Sole Sourcing 1.11629 
Second Sourcing 7.07268 .06001 
Sole Sourcing -1.27365 
Second Sourcing 9.33119 -.30642 
* The table entries are the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon statistics for the null hypothesis that the 
distribution of bids is the same for both types of sellers. 
Experiment 
I 
II 
III 
IV 
TABLE 8: Comparison of Investment Expenditure by Sellers with Commercial 
Marlcets and Sellers without Commercial Markets* 
Initial Phase Reprocurement Phase 
Sole Sourcing 
Second Sourcing .43935 .24646 
Sole Sourcing 2.86117 .20028 
Second Sourcing -5.93706 1.68773 
Sole Sourcing .75204 1.35222 
Second Sourcing -8.05576 -.39806 
Sole Sourcing 2.50369 -.31675 
Second Sourcing -10.16891 .07536 
* The table entries are the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon statistics for the null hypothesis that the 
distribution of investment levels is the same for both types of sellers. 
TABLE 9: Evaluation of the Effect of Second Sourcing on Procurement Cost: 
Percentage Price Change Due to Competitive Reprocurement 
(A) Estimates Based on the Standard Methodology 
(B) Actual 
Inital 
Experiment Procurement Reprocurement Total 
Phase Phase 
I A 0.0000 --o.6794 --o.3397 
B 1.2232 --o.2873 0.4679 
II A 0.0000 --o.6659 --o.3330 
B 1.0832 --o.3041 0:3896 
III A 0.0000 --o.6684 --o.3342 
B 1.1004 --o.3035 0.3985 
IV A 0.0000 --o.6043 --o.3021 
B 0.9932 --o.2112 0.3910 
DATEO 
.i 
Buyer chooses 
sourcing mode 
DATEO 
.i 
.1e incumbent is 
:termined 
INITIAL PHASE 
PERIOD 1 
l 
A ,B andC do 
R&D to determine 
their costs, cA h Cs 1 
and cCI. for period 
1. 
Th'ITIAL PHASE 
PERIOD 1 
l 
Non-incumbents do 
R&D paying s 1 per 
unit to enter the 
market 
F1GURE 1 : Timing of Events 
DATE I 
.i 
·A ,B andC sub-
mit bids, hAl, bat 
and bel· 
· The winner is 
deternUned 
(say A). 
· A produces one 
unit at cost cA 1 and 
is paid bAI• 
DATE I 
.i 
· R&D outcomes 
are observed: "suc-
cess" or "failure". 
· The incumbent 
and the nonincum-
bents who 
"succeed", if there 
are any, share the 
market. 
MARKET 1 
REPROCUREMENT PHASE 
PERIOD2 
l 
If buyer has chosen sole 
source: 
· A does R&D to deternUne 
his second-period cost. cA 2• 
If buyer has chosen second 
sourcing: 
·A ,B andC do R&D to 
determine their second-period 
costs, cA1• Cs2 and cc2· 
MARKET :2. 
REPROCUREMEJ\'T PHASE 
PERIOD2 
l 
If buyer has chosen sole 
source: 
· Nonincumbents who did not 
succeed do R&D paying s 2 
per unit to enter the market in 
period 2. 
If buyer has chosen second 
sourcing: 
• Nonincumbents who did not 
succeed do R&D paying s' 2 
per unit to enter the market in 
period 2. 
DATE2 
.i 
If buyer has chosen 
sole source: 
·A produces one 
more unit at cost 
c,u and is paid b . u. 
If buyer has chosen 
second sourcing: 
·A ,B andC sub-
mit bids, bA2, bs2 
and bc2· 
· The winner is 
deternllned (say B ) 
· B produces 1 unit 
at c82 and is paid 
bs2· 
DATE2 
.i 
· R&D outcomes 
are observed: "suc-
cess" or "failure". 
· The incumbent 
and the nonincum-
bents who 
"succeed", if there 
are any, share the 
market. 
END OF 
PROGRAM 
END OF 
PROGRAM 
0 
Ill 
ci 
0 
.... 
Inc 
0 
u 
z 
oo 
t=:l'l 
uci 
~ 
0 
0 
Q: 
D.. 
00 
w"! tic 
w 
D.. 
~ 
0 
~ 
ci 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
" 
\ 
\ 
\ 
' ' 
:' ., 
~n) 
ll(n~ 
. .....__ 
", 
......._ 
',, 
" ll(n) + a(n) 
" ....__ 
...._ 
--
....._. 
.. --
ll(n)-a(n) ·-.... . ...._. _. _. __ . -·~ 
g ·--· ~- ~· 
ci 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 
INVESTMENT 
FIGURE 2: Expected production cost as a function of investment ( jl(n)) 
and expected production cost based on the random numbers used 
in the experiments ( ~(n)) 
w 
u 
!t: 
0.. 
SOLE SOURCING SECOND SOURCING 
• • u u 
m 
w 
u 
!t: 
0.. 
<{ 
u 
t}L-----------------~----------------~ t)L-----------------~----------------~ 
INITIAL PROCUREMENT 
PHASE 
REPROCUREMENT 
PHASE 
INITIAL PROCUREMENT 
PHASE 
REPROCUREMENT 
PHASE 
FIGURE 3.0: Time profile of prices und!)r sole sourcing and second sourcing 
(Hypothetical) 
0 
"" 0 
0 
I') 
0 
wo 
UN a:: 0 
n_O 
0 
~ 
0 
0 
SOLE SOURCING 
--------- -· ----------·-
OL-------------~--------------~ 
0 INITIAL PROCUREMENT 
PHASE 
REPROCUREMENT 
PHASE 
SECOND SOURCING 
0 
"" 0 
0 
I') 
0 
w 
uo 
- N 0:: 0 
n_O 
0 
~ 
0 
0 
.. average 
OL------------'-----------~ 
0 INITIAl PROCUREMENT 
PHASE 
REPROCUREMENT 
PHASE 
FIGURE 3o2: Experiment 2- Time prolile of prices (c. = 0, c• = I ) 
w 
u 
n:: 
0 
"" 0 
0 
I') 
0 
n_o 
WN 
~ . 
<(0 
n:: 
w 
;;;: 
0 
~ 
0 
0 
(A) 
A 
w 
u 
n:: 
0 
"" 0 
0 
I') 
0 
n_o 
WN 
~ . 
<(0 
lr 
w 
;;;: 
0 
~ 
0 
0 
(B) 
OL------L------~----~------L-----~ o.__ __ .._ __ _,_ __ _.__ _ _,_ __ ...... 
0 0. 5 10 15 20 25 oo. 5 10 15 
SESSION SESSION 
FIGURE 4.2: Experiment 2- Average procurement price (c. = 0, c' = I ) 
A) Sole sourcing, 8) Second sourcing with government data rights 
20 25 
I--
z 
ll) 
a 
a 
'¢ 
C! 
a 
WI") 
:!:a I-- • VIa 
w 
> z 
w (!)N 
<(a a:: . 
wa 
~ 
~ 
q 
a 
a 
(A) 
I--
z 
ll) 
a 
a 
'¢ 
a 
a 
WI") 
:!:a I-- • VIa 
w 
> z 
w 
(!)N 
<(a 
a:: . 
wa 
~ 
~ 
a 
a 
a 
(B) 
aL-----~------~----~------L-----~ 
.._ __ .._ __ _._ _ _..;._._ __ _._ __ _. 
a 0. 5 10 15 20 25 ao. 5 10 15 20 25 
SESSION SESSION 
FIGURE 5.2: Experiment 2- Average investment expenditure 
A) Sole so·urcing, B) Second sourcing with government data rights 
1-
z 
I() 
a 
ci 
-¢ 
a 
a 
wt"l 
:<a 1- . Vla 
w 
> z 
w 
CJN 
<(a 0:: • 
wa 
~ 
~ 
a 
a 
(A) 
1-
z 
I() 
a 
a 
-¢ 
a 
a 
wt"l 
:<a 1- . Vla 
w 
> z 
w 
CJN 
<(a 0:: • 
wa 
> <( 
~ 
a 
a 
(B) 
r ·· •· 1 .;.t~ ..-u \r• 
8L---~----~----~--~7---~ 
a 0. 5 10 15 20 25 
a 
aL-----~----~----~----L---~ 
oo. 5 10 15 20 25 
SESSION SESSION 
FIGURE 6.2: Experiment 2- Average investment expenditure (initial phase) 
A) Sole sourcing, D) Second sourcing with government data rights 
0 
0 
. 
~ 
0 
00 
ci 
0 
010 
ffici 
w 
(!) 
ii 
wo 
>..q-
<( • 
0 
0 
~ 
ci 
w 
(A) 
0 
0 
~ 
0 
IX! 
0 
0 
010 
mci 
w 
(!) 
<( 
n: 
wo 
>..q-
<( • 
0 
0 
~ 
ci 
(B) 
0 
OL-----L----J----~-----L---~ 
0 
OL---~L---~-----L-----L--~ 
ci o. 5 1 0 15 20 25 ci o. 5 1 0 1 5 20 25 
SESSION 
FIGURE 7.2.A: Experiment 2.A ·Sole Sourcing 
Average initial phase bid by 
A) Sellers with commercial markets 
B) Sellers without commercialmarlwts 
SESSION 
0 q 
~ 
0 
«! 
0 
0 
010 
rnci 
w (!) 
<( 
0:: 
wo ~": 
0 
0 
C'! 
0 
(A) 
t-· .... . ... ~ ..... 
0 
0 
~ 
0 
co 
ci 
0 
010 
IDO 
w 
(!) 
<( 
0:: 
wo ~": 
0 
0 
C'! 
0 
(B) 
g~~~~ ci o. 5 10 15 20 25 0 qL---~----~---L--~~--~ 00. 5 10 15 20 25 
SESSION 
FIGURE 7.2.8 : Experiment 2.8- Second Sourcing 
Average initial phase bid by 
A) Sellers with commercial markets 
8) Sellers without commercial markets 
SESSION 
1-
z 
10 
0 
ci 
'<t 
0 
ci 
WI') 
::Eo 1- • 
VlO 
w 
> z 
w 
(!)<'I 
~C? 
wo 
~ 
~ 
0 
0 
.... . . . . . 
(A) 
. .. 1-
z 
10 
0 
ci 
'<t 
0 
ci 
WI') 
::Eo 1- • 
VlO 
w 
> z 
w (!)N 
<(0 0:: • 
Ill O 
~ 
~ 
C? 
0 
(B) 
gl_ __ ~----~--~7---~--~ 
0 o. 5 10 
0 C?.._ __ ..__ __ ..._ __ ........ __ _._ __ _. 
0 0. 25 5 15 25 20 10 15 20 
SESSION SESSION 
FIGURE 8.2.A .: Experiment 2.A - Sole Sourcing 
Average initial phase investment expenditure by 
A) Sellers with commercial markets 
B) Sellers without commercial markets 
1-
z 
I() 
a 
a 
'<t 
a 
a 
wt<l 
:::>:a 1- • lila 
w 
> z 
w 
oN <(a cr: • 
wa 
?( 
~ 
a 
0 
a 
(A) 
...... 
1-
z 
I() 
a 
ci 
'<t 
a 
a 
wt<l 
:::>:a 1- • lila 
w 
> z 
w 
oN 
<(a cr: • 
wa 
?( 
~ 
a 
a 
(B) 
a I----~--~--'----'-----' 
a qL----..i.----1----'----'--_.. 
ci 0. 5 10 15 20 25 a o. 5 10 15 20 25 
SESSION SESSION 
FIGURE 8.2.B : Experiment 2.B -Second Sourcing 
Average initial phase investment expenditure by 
A) Sellers with commercial markets 
B) Sellers without commercial markets 
Ill 
"'Tw ~ Cl 
H~ 
w 
0 
"'t ir ,.._ 0. 
~ 
... 
- ...,_, 
0 
tl) 
., 
"' 
d 
lo. 
., 
"' I 
:5 
I 
"' 
,.._ 
I 
8 
~ 
I 
on 
"' -I 
I 
5 
(A) 
10 15 20 25 
SESSION 
FIGURE 9.2 : Experiment 2 -Evaluation of the effect of second sourcing 
on reprocurement cost 
A) Percentage price change due to second sourcing as 
measured by the procedure used in empirical studies 
B) Actual percentage price change due to second sourcing 
"' 'Tw 
- !!I 
~+~ 
w 
0 
ont~ 
,.._ IL 
~ 
.. 
...... 
0 
on 
., 
"' 
ci 
0. 5 
., 
"' I 
0 
on 
I 
., 
..... 
I 
8 
~ 
I 
on 
N 
~ 
I 
(A) 
"' 
(B) 
"' 
w 
- !!I z 
0 < :I: 0 0 
- w 
0 
., ~ 
..... IL 
~ 
... 
...... 
0 
"' 
I~ 
on 
"' 
0 
10 15 20 25 10 15 
SESSION on 
"' I 
~ 
I 
on 
..... 
I 
0 
0 
-I 
"' 
"' 
-I 
FIGURE 10.2 : Experiment 2 - Evaluation of the effect of second sourcing 
on total program cost 
A) Percentage price change due to second sourcing as 
measured by the procedure used in empirical studies 
B) Actual percentage price change due to second sourcing 
20 25 
SESSION 
l!il 
ll!i I 
liD I 
w 15 
(.') 
[ !iJ 
I 
u 
w l!i 
u 
H 
0:: 
a.. 
l 
('\ -l!i 
N 
v 
-ID 
-15 )
-liD 
(A) 
0<& 
,. 
(',.',(' 
I II III 
l!il 
ll!i I 
liD I 
w 15 
(.') 
[ !iJ 
I 
u 
w l!i 
u 
H 0 
0:: 
a.. 
('\ ·ili 
N 
v-ID 
-15 I 
(8) 
I II 
-- ---------
·liD 
FIGURE 11.2: Experiment 2- Evaluation of the effect of second sourcing on 
I. initial procurement cost, II. reprocurement cost, HI. total cost 
A) Percentage price change due to second sourcing as 
measured by the procedure used in empirical studies 
B) Actual percentage price change due to second sourcing 
I 
I 
II I I 
I 
23 
REFERENCES 
Anton, J. and D. Yao. 1987a "Second Sourcing and the Experience Curve: Price Competition in 
Defense Procurement." Rand Journal of Economics 18: 57-76. 
_____ . 1987b. "Measuring the Effectiveness of Competition in Defense Procurement: 
A survey." Mimeographed. Stony Brook, N.Y.: SUNY. 
Besen, S. M. and K. L. Terasawa. 1987a. "A Prototype Model of Defense Procurement." 
Working Paper #WD-3732-PA&E. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation 
(MDA -903-85-C -0030). 
_____ . 1987b. "An Introduction to the Economics of Procurement." Working Paper #WD-
3555-PA&E. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation. (MDA-903-85-C-0030). 
Demski, J., D. Sappington, and P. Spiller. 1987. "Managing Supplier Switching." Rand Journal of 
Economics 18: 77-97. 
Gii!er, K. 1988. "Pre-Auction R&D Behavior in Private Value Auctions -Part 1." Mimeographed. 
Pasadena, Calif.: California Institute of Technology. 
Harris, M. and A. Raviv. 1982. "Allocation Mechanisms and the Design of Auctions." 
Econometrica 44: 1477-1499. 
Laffont, J. J. and J. Tiro1e. 1987a. "Repeated Auctions oflncentive Contracts, Investment and 
Bidding Parity." Mimeographed. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
_____ . 1987b. "Auctioning Incentive Contracts." Journal of Political Economy 95: 
921-937. 
Maskin, E. andJ. Riley. 1984. "Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers." Econometrica 52: 
1473-1518. 
_____ ·. 1986. "Asymmetric Auctions." Mimeographed. Los Angeles, Calif.: UCLA. 
McAffee, P. and J. McMillan. 1985a. "Bidding for Contracts: A Principal-Agent Analysis." 
Mimeographed. London, Ontario: University of Western Ontario. 
-----· 1985b. "Discrimination in Auctions." Mimeographed. London, Ontario: 
University of Western Ontario. 
24 
Milgram, P. and R. Weber. 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding." Econometrica 
50: 1089-1122. 
Myerson, R. 1981. "Optimal Auction Design." Mathematics of Operations Research 6: 58-73. 
Riley, J. and W. Samuelson. 1981. "Optimal Auctions." American Economic Review 71: 381-392. 
Riordan, M. and D. Sappington. 1988. "Second Sourcing." Center for Economic Policy Research 
Publication No. 125. Calif.: Stanford University. 
Rob, R. 1986. "The Design of Procurement Contracts." American Economic Review 76: 378-389. 
U.S Government. 1987. Federal Register 52: 12393. 
U.S. Senate Anned Services Committee. 1985. Implementation of the 1984 Defense Procurement 
Legislation. 
------· 1986. Acquisition Findings in the Report of the President's Blue Ribbon 
Commission on Defense Management. 
Vickrey, W. 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions and Competitive Sealed Tenders." Journal of 
Finance 16: 8-17. 
Yuspeh, L. 1976. "A Case for Increasing the Use of Competition in the Departtnent of Defense." In 
Bidding and Auctioning for Procurement and Allocation, edited by Yakov Amihud. New 
York: NYU Press. 
